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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT "BUDDY" WASHINGTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 12088 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The Defendant-Appellant was charged with 
two crimes, to-wit; receiving stolen property 
having a value in excess of Fifty Dollars 
($50.00) in violation of Section 76-38-12 U.C.A. 
1953, as amended, and being an habitual 
criminal in violation of Section 76-1-18, U.C.A. 
1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court, by jury verdict, found 
the Defendant-Appellant guilty on both charges 
and Defendant-Appellant was sentenced by the 
Honorable Dallas H. Young to a term in the Utah 
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State Prison not to exceed five years on the 
charge of receiving stolen goods, and the 
further term of not less than fifteen years 
on the charge of being an habitual criminal 
said terms to be served concurrently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a directed verdict of 
not guilty as a matter of law on both charges 
or alternatively, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts upon which the State relies to 
establish the crimes, as alleged, are as follows: 
A series of burglaries·were perpetrated 
in or about the City of Ogden, State of Utah 
during the months of August, September, and 
October, 1969. (T. 4, 10, 15, 23, 32) • 
Certain articles were taken in the burglaries 
which were admitted into evidence as state's 
Exhibits "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "G", "H" and 
"I " • (T • 9 6) • 
Officers Balls and Buzick testified that 
they recovered the State's Exhibits nA n, nB n, 
ncn TTDTT !TETI TTGTT TTJ-ITT and nrll from the pre-
' ' ' ' mises located at 122 Doxey and 118 Doxey, Ogden, 
Utah. (T. 87, 94). These premises are the 
resisences of Shirley Owens a/k/a Shirley 
Gallegos, Lester and Faye Hall, and James 
McClellan. (T. 62, 40, 83). The Appellant 
resides at 2?71 Lincoln, Ogden, Utah. (T. 114) • 
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Howard Wade testified for and on behalf 
of the state that he is the owner of Exhibit 
"A" . t . f P 1 consi~ ing o a o aroid Camera, (T. 4, 5) 
and that it was removed from his residence on 
or about September 25, 1969. (T. 4). Mr. Wade 
testified that the value of Exhibit "A 11 , when 
new was $225.00 (T. 9), while admitting the 
camera was two.and one-half years old. (T. 9) 
C. W. Hartman testified that he owned 
Exhibit 11B11 , a black persian lamb jacket~ 
(T. 11). Mr. Hartman's testimony as to value 
was $550.00, but was based solely on replace-
ment value and not current market value of 
Exhibit 11B 11 • (T. 13) • Mrs. Faye Hall received 
this coat from Shirely Owens and the Appellant 
was never involved with it. (T. 59). 
Exhibit "C", a black and white Dumont 
Television set, was taken from the premises 
of Dale Iverson. (T. 16). Appellant has never 
had possession of this television. Shirley 
Owens moved it to a neighbor's house. (T. 69, 
70). It was found at 118 Doxey, the residences 
of James McClellan (T. 45, 56, 93) by Officer 
Balls. 
Virginia M. Chase, a witness for the 
state claimed ownership of Exhibits "D" and 
' • d "E 11 , consisting of a Westinghouse Radio an a 
pendant watch (T. 23, 26). The value of the . 
radio was established at $7.97 (T. 28), how-
ever identification was not clearly established 
inasmuch as an invoice, Exhibit "F", recited 
a serial nwnber, RD11D28A, but no evidence was 
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elicited to show whether Exhibit 11D" had a 
corresponding serial number. (T. 24). No 
value was ever established for Exhibit "E". 
(T. 26) . Exhibit nEu, the pendant watch 
was given to Mrs. Faye Hall by Shirley ' 
Owens. (T. 55) • 
Muriel Hardy testified that Exhibit 
uG u t. b , an an ique gun, elonged to her. (T. 32). 
Sentimental value of $50.00 was placed on 
Exhibit uG" by Mrs. Hardy.; (T. 37, 38). 
Exhibit "Gu was positively identified as not 
being one of the guns the Appellant sold to 
Lester Hall. (T. 45). Exhibit uH", a hair-
dryer, was also identified by Mrs. Hardy as 
part of some articles taken from the Hardy 
residence. (T. 33). However, her only means 
of identification was its standard container. 
(T. 36, 37). No present market value ·was 
ever introduced into evidence of the hair-
dryer, but only the recitation of the price 
tag attached thereto. (T. 35) while an 
admission was made that the hairdryer was 
two years old. (T. 33). 
Exhibit "Iu, a Silvertone Color Television 
was identified by Mrs. Hardy as belonging to 
her. (T. 34, 35). However, this testimony 
was in conflict with her testimony at the pre-
liminary Hearing wherein she stated she could 
not identify the television as being hers. 
(T. 38). Mr. Lester Hall testified he did not 
know how this color television got into his 
home. (T. 49, 50). Mrs. Faye Hall, wife of 
Lester Hall testified that she and another . ' 
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friend brought the color television over 
to the Hall residence, and that Appellant 
did not bring the television to the Halls. 
(T. 56). Once again the only valuation of 
E h ·b·t "I" x 1 1 was the purchase price of 
$400.00 and not the present market value 
of this two year old set (T. 34). 
Officer B~lls made a promise to the 
Halls, McClellan, and Shirley Owens that 
if they would cooperate that no complaint 
would be filed. (T. 99). Officer Balls 
stated that he knew the amount that was 
paid for the various items, to-wit; $12.00 
for the Polaroid camera and $30.00 for the 
color T.V., but that _this was not sufficient, 
in his opinion, to establish .a possible 
charge of possession of stolen goods. (T. 10~). 
Appellant took the stand in his own 
behalf and testified that he was attempting 
to sell the goods· for a friend. ·(T. 115) • 
Corroboration of this testimony came from 
Holly Steele. (T. 108). On cross-examination 
of the Appellant, the state was allowed, 
over timely objection, to inquire concerning 
some credit cards. (T. 126, 127). 
The credit cards were admitted, over 
Appellant's objection, for the sole purpose 
of impeachment. (T. 131). The State attempted 
to introduce proposed Exhibits "M", "N" and 
"O", and Appellant again made timely 
objection which was sustained, even though the 
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State urged admission for purposes of impeach-
ment only. (T. 13 6) . 
The case was then submitted to the jury 
on the charge of possession of stolen goods 
in excess of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) and the 
jury received their instruction. (T. 138). 
Counsel for Appellant took exception to the 
Court's refusal to give proposed instructions 
relating to testimony of accomplices and the 
need for corroborating evidence and the 
failure to instruct on a lesser included 
charge. (T. 138, 139, 140). The jury found 
the Appellant guilty of the charge of possession 
of stolen property having a value in excess of 
Fifty Dollars ($50.00). 
The trial was then continued on the second 
charge, to-wit; that Appellant is in the status 
of an habitual criminal in violation of 
Section 76-1-18, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
(T. 141). The State produced James W. Johnson, 
its only witness, who is the records _and 
identification officer at the Utah State 
Prison. (T. 143). Certain copies of records 
were brought to the Court by Mr. Johnson. 
(T. 144). State Exhibits 1 and 2, which were· 
admitted over Appellant's objection, consist 
of unverified copies of alleged corrunitments 
from Salt Lake County District Courts. 
(T. 151, 152, 153). State's Exhibits 1, 2, 3 
and 4 were all admitted over Appellant's 
objection. The jury was then instructed. 
(T. 157). The counsel for Appellant excepted 
to instruct~on number 7. (T. 157). 
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The jury entered a verdict of guilty 
and the Court set time for sentencing. 
(T. 157, 158). Appellant was sentenced to 
a term of not more than five years and to 
a term of not less than fifteen years in 
the Utah State Prison (R. 27). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE 
STATE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW TO SUSTAIN 
APPELLANTrs CONVICTION AND THE 
TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT GRANT-
ING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT. 
At the conclusion of the State's evidence, 
counsel for Appellant made a timely and appropri-
ate motion for dismissal and alternatively for 
a directed verdict based upon Section 77-31-18 
u.c.A., 1953, as amended, which states: · 
nconviction on testimony of 
accomplice. A conviction shall 
not be had on the testimony of 
an accomplice, unless he is 
corroborated by other evidence, 
which in itself and without the 
aid of the testimony of the 
accomplice tends to connect the 
defendant with the commission 
of the offense; and the corrob-
oration shall not be sufficient, 
if it merely shows the commission 
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of the offense or the circwn-
stances thereof.TT 
Examination of the witnesses and the 
evidence against Appellant is in three 
categories, to-wit; the victims, the retrievers 
and the accomplices. The state's witnesses 
Howard Wade, C. W. Hartman, Dale Iverson 
Virginia M. Chase and Muriel Hardy repre~ent 
the first class called the victims. All of 
these witnesses, without exception, testified 
that they were the owners of certain properties 
consisting of Exhibits TIA TT !TB" TTcn !TD" "En 
' ' . ' ' ' nGn, nHn and TTI", and that these properties 
were removed from the respective owner by a 
person or persons unknown. None had ever known 
the Appellant nor had any of these witnesses 
ever observed the Appellant in possession of 
their properties. 
The second category of witnesses, the 
retrievers, consist· of officers Murlin Balls, 
Charles Buzick, and Mr. James McClellan. The 
substance of the testimony of these three 
witnesses consist of recovery of the properties 
identified as Exhibits TIA TT' TTB Tl' TTCTT' TIDTI' TIETT' 
TTG TT' TTHTI and TTI TT from the premises of Lester 
Hall, Shirley Owens, a/k/a Shirle~ Gallegos and 
James McClellen. None of these witnesses 
observed any of the subject properties in the 
possession of the Appellant. 
The third category of the state's witnesses 
the accomplices, consist of Lest:r Hall, Faye 
Hall and Shirely Owens, a/k/a Shirley Gallegos. 
All of these witnesses were granted immunity o.f 
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prosecution by Officer Balls if they cooperated. 
(T. 99). The law is very clear in Utah in 
defining an accomplice. In State v. Fertig, 
120 Utah 224, 233 P2d 347, 348 this Court 
stated, quoting from an earlier case, State v. 
Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P2d 458, 461: 
"In this. State we have no statutory 
definition of an accomplice, but 
the court has construed the word to 
refer to one who is or could be ., 
charged as a principal with the 
defendant on trial." 
It is true that Officer Balls testified 
that in his opinion there was not enough 
reason to suspect that Lester Hall, Faye Hall 
and Shirley Owens might be guilty of possession 
of stolen property (T. 102, 103, 104). However 
Officer Balls did know the property was recently 
stolen. (T. 104). He knew that the Halls had 
paid $12. 00 for Exhibit "A", the Polaroid 
Camera and $30.00 for Exhibit "!", the color 
television, and received as gifts.Exhibits "B" 
and "E", the coat and watch respectively. 
Shirley Owens did not have any explanation as· 
to the possession of Exhibits "C", "G" and 
"H" the black and white television, the gun 
' and the hairdryer respectively. State v. 
Bruner, 106 Utah 49, 145 P2d 302, 304 it states: 
"Even if they had not told 
Appellant that these goods had 
been stolen, the fact that they 
concealed them on a city dump 
over two miles away would 
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indicate to any reasonable 
person that they did so 
because they did not want 
the articles to be found in 
their possession -- a circum-
stance which would at least 
suggest that the•articles 
were "hot".TT 
Section 78-38-1, reads in part: 
TT. . . Possession of property 
recently stolen, when the 
person in possession fails 
to make a satisfactory 
explanation, shall be deemed 
prima facie evidence of guilt.TT 
This same section was cited in State v. Vigil, 
infra, as tending to show corroboration of the 
crime of possession of stolen goods. 
The Halls and Shirley Owens not only had 
possession of goods known to be recently 
stolen, but secreted both the black and white 
television and the color television, Exhibits 
"B" and "I" respectively, in a neighbor's 
basement because they thought it might be 
"hot". 
Officer Ball's testimony in this respect 
must be severely discounted and taken in 
light of his promise not to file charges 
against the accomplices, is not only suspicion, 
but evidence which the Court has held as 
sufficient t'o convict for the crime of 
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possession ·Of stolen goods. 
Appellant is charged with violating 
Section 76-38-12 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, 
which states: 
nReceiving stolen property. 
--Every person who for his own 
gain or"to prevent the owner 
from again possessing his pro-
perty, buys or receives any 
personal property exceeding 
$50.00 in value, knowing the 
same to have been stolen, is 
punishable by imprisonment in 
the state prison not exceeding 
five years, . TT 
Lester Hall purchased from the Appellant what 
has been identified as state's Exhibits nAn 
and nr TT. (T. 44) . Mrs. Faye Hall testified 
she purchased Exhibit TTin from the Appellant. 
(T 0 56). Mrs. Hall further stated that she 
received the watch, Exhibit nEn and the black 
fur coat, Exhibit TTcn from Shirley Owens, 
(T. 55, 59) and that the Appellant brought 
the radio, Exhibit nun and left it with the 
Halls. (T. 55, 57). Shirley Owens, a/k/a 
Shirley Gallegos testified that she kept the 
hairdryer, Exhibit TTHTT (T. 69) and that she 
had Exhibit nGn, the rifle in her possession 
when it was recovered by the police. (T. 67). 
Shirley Owens further testified that she 
moved the black and white television, Exhibit 
TTB" next door to Mr. McClellan's residence. 
(T. 77) • 
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The foregoing acts of purchase and/or 
possession of the very property in question 
makes Lester Hall, Faye Hall and Shirley 
Owens, a/k/a Shirley Gallegos accomplices. 
They could have been charged with the 
identical crime as the Appellant. 
There is no evidence other than that of 
these three witnesses, who were accomplices, 
to show the crime with which Appellant has 
been charged. The state clearly proved the 
possession by the three accomplices, but not 
as to the Appellant. This falls under the 
purview of State v. Vigil, 123 Utah, 495, 
260 P2d, 539, 541 wherein the court stated: 
nHowever, the corroborating 
evidenc~ must connect the 
Defendant with the commission 
of the offense ... n (citations 
omitted) 
The offense is having possession. No evidence 
existed at the time the state rested its case 
and the motion made of the Appellant's 
possession other than the accomplices' uncor-
roborated testimony. Therefore, as a matter 
of law, Appellant was entitled to a directed 
verdict inasmuch as Appellant could not, as a 
matter of law, be convicted on uncorroborated 
testimony of accomplices. 
Appellant's motion for dismissal, based 
on the State's failure to prove a prima facie 
case, was a~propriate and the trial court 
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erred in refusing to grant said motion. 
Not only did the State fail to show any 
corroborating evidence of the alleged crime, 
but the State ·failed to establish any basis 
for the valuation of Exhibits "A" "B" "C" · ' , ' "D", "E", "G" and "I". The only valuation 
on these items ~ame from the owners except 
Exhibit "C", the black and white television 
set which was valued by a repairman at l~.ss 
than $25.00. (T. 21). -
Exhibit "A'", the Polaroid Camera, was 
valued by Howard Wade at $225.00. Mr. Wade 
received Exhibit "A" as a gift, two and one-
half years ago and his valuation is the cost 
of the camera when he received the gift. 
(T. 8, 9). No present market valuation 
exists. Exhibit "B", the black fur coat, was 
valued by Mr.· C. W. Hartman at $550.00. This 
valuation was based solely on replacement cost 
and not present market value. (T. 12, 13). 
Mr. Dale Iverson, at page 21 of the 
transcript admitted that Exhibit "C" in its 
present condition was valued at less than 
$25.00. Exhibits "D" and "E", identified 
by Virginia M. Chase, were valued at $7.97 
for the radio, Exhibit "D", but no value was 
even given for the watch, Exhibit "E". 
(T. 28, 26) • 
Mrs. Muriel Hardy identified Exhibits "G". 
"H" and "I", the gun, hairdryer and color T.V. 
respectively~ Sentimental value of $50.00 
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was placed on the gun, (T. 37, 38) however, 
Mrs. Hardy admitted that the gun would not 
sell for $50.00. The hairdryer apparently 
had a price tag on it which reflected a 
price of $23.79. Mrs. Hardy testified that 
this is what she paid for the hairdryer 
(T. 35), while admitting that the original 
bonnet had been replaced with a different 
color and that the hairdryer was at least 
two years old. (T. 3 7, 3 3) . Exhibit npT, 
the color television, was purchased from 
Sears for $400.00. (T. 34). No evidence was 
elicited or made of record which reflects 
what the present market value of Exhibit urn 
is, which was at least two years old (T. 34). 
In net effect, no competent evidence 
exists to show that the item or items had a 
present market value in excess of $50.00. 
The cost of an item, or the sentimental value 
of an item, or the replacement value of an 
item, or no value at all on an item is not 
competent evidence to submit to a jury that 
Exhibits TTATT, TTBTT, TTCTT, TTDTT, TIETT, TT(jTT and TTITT 
had a present value in excess of $50.00 at 
the time they were allegedly in the possession 
of the Appellant. The state failed in establish-
ing a prima facie case of the crime charged, 
and as a matter of law Appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss was proper and should have been granted. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LAW 
APPLI"CAI3LE TO THE TESTIMONY OF AN 
ACCOMPLICE AND THE REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT 
ON A LESSER OFFENSE. 
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Counsel for Appellant requested three 
instructions which relate to the need for 
corroborating evidence and that the Appellant 
cannot be convicted upon the testimony of 
accomplices only. (T. 139, 140) • ·Exception 
was taken upon the Court's refusal to so 
instruct the jury. In State v. Hall, 112 
Utah 272, 186 ~~d 970 the Court recognized 
the right of an accused to have the jury 
instructed concerning testimony of accom.-::. 
plices. In Hall, supra, however as well as 
in State v. Scott, 22 Ut2d 27, 447 P2d 908,. 
the trial counsel failed to request the 
proper instructions. However, instructions. 
were submitted in this instance and timely 
exceptions taken to the Trial Court's 
refusal to so instruct the jury. 
Other jurisdictions, notably Arizona 
and California, have held that it is 
reversible error not to so instruct the jury. 
even though no instructions were requested. 
In State v. Owen, 3 Ariz. App. 509, ~15 P2d 
907, 909 the Arizona Court states: 
"No instruction was requested or 
given to the jury pertaining to 
the law applicable to the testi-
mony of an accomplice • • • 
failure to instruct the jury on 
the· applicable principles of law 
concerning the necessity for 
corroboration of the testimony 
of an accomplice, even though not 
requested,. is reversible. error ••• " 
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In People v. Wade, 169 C.A.2d 554, 337 P2d 
502, 504 the California Court states: 
"It does not appear from the 
record that defendants offered 
any instructions regarding accom-
plices. This does not relieve 
the court of the duty to give 
such instructions sue sponte, 
even though the question is one 
of fact for the jury. It is 
incumbent upon the court to 
instruct the jury fully upon the 
law in a criminal case. This 
rule includes instructions con-
cerning the law pertaining to 
accompl~ces and corroboration 
when applicable." (citations 
omitted) 
The Trial Court's refusal in this instance, 
when proper instructions are requested, 
together with timely exceptions, constitute 
reversible error. 
The Trial Court further refused, although 
initial indication was given that it would be 
given, to instruct the jury about the lesser 
offense of a misdemeanor if the jury found the 
value was less than Fifty Dollars ($50.00). 
The jury was in effect instructed that the 
value was in excess of Fifty Dollars ($50.00). 
This is a fact which must be found by the jury 
and not the Court. In State v. Valdez, 19 
.Ut2d 426, 4)2 P2d 53, 54 this Court stated: 
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"As a general rule the trial 
court should submit to the jury 
included offenses where the 
evidence would justify such a 
verdict." 
Contrary to the Valdez situation, Appellant's 
trial counsel di9.request specifically an 
instruction on the lesser offense. It is 
prejudicial to the Appellant and reversible 
error not to so instruct, since the failure· 
to do so constitutes an affirmative instruction 
to the jury that the value of the property in 
question which Appellant allegedly had in his 
possession exceeded Fifty Dollars ($50.00). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
EXHIBITS J, K, AND L, INTO EVIDENCE. 
The Trial Court, over Appellant's timely 
objection allowed into evidence Exhibits '~", 
"K" and "L", consisting of three· credit cards; 
(T. 131). The basic objection is to an 
improper foundation as well as materiality. 
(T. 126, 131, 135). There is no materiality 
to the credit cards unless Appellant was 
charged with an offense encompassing said 
cards. It is true that the credit cards were 
admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment~ 
(T. 131). However, the possession of them 
does not impeach Appellant's testimony. 
·Officer Richard E. Petersen's testimony 
reflects the lack of foundation. Officer 
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Petersen at pages 134 through 136 of the 
record discloses that certain items, among 
which were Exhibits "J 1; "K" and "L", .were 
given to him as being the Appellant's 
personal effects. This is hearsay evidence 
of the individual or individuals who 
allegedly obtained these personal effects. 
It was prejudicial to Appellant to have 
before the jury, even for the limited pur-
pose of impeachment (instruction No. 10) , 
where the jury is not instructed on impeach-
ment, and where this so-called impeachment 
evidence tends to implicate the Appellant to 
the crime of burglary. The obvious prejudice 
of this immaterial and hearsay evidence is not 
overcome by the ·simple unexplained instruction. 
It is, therefore, reversible error to admit 
Exhibits "J" "K" and "L". ' 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
STATE'S EXHIBITS l·and 2, AND THE 
STATE FAILED IN THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
TO ESTABLISH APPELLANT AS AN 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL. 
The state called James Johnson as its 
only witness in an attempt to establis~ the 
prior conviction, sentencings and commitments 
pursuant to Section 76-1-18 U.C.A., 1953, as 
emended. The Trial Court allow~d the intro-
duction of, and receipt of Exhibits 1 and 2, 
over the obj~ction of Appellant's counsel, 
into evidence. (T. 150, 152, 153). These 
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exhibits consist of alleged copies of docu-
ments purporting to be commitments of the 
Appellant. (T. 144). Both of these alleged 
copies of purported commitments are from the 
Salt Lake County District Court. (T. 150, 
152). The sole witness admits on page 152 of 
the transcript: 
•• 
"Question: And you don't know whether 
or not this is a true and 
accurate record of the 
sentence and commitment of 
Buddy Washington from the 
Salt Lake County Court, do 
"Answer: 
·you?" 
Well, I don't suppose that 
I know any of them are true 
and accurate as far as that 
goes then." 
.. 
Appellant's counsel objected and asserted 
that the state should have some official record 
from Salt Lake County Court and not copies from 
the Utah State Prison files to establish any 
alleged conviction, sentence and commitment. 
(T. 153). The records offered and admitted by 
the trial court were hearsay as to any alleged 
conviction, sentence and/or commitment. There-
fore, the State has failed in its burden of 
proof on the issue of Appellant being in the 
status of an habitual criminal. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING 
APPELLANT TWICE FOR THE SINGLE 
OFFENSE. 
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Appellant was sentenced twice. First for 
a term of not more than five years and again 
for a term not less than fifteen years, both 
to be served in the Utah State Prison, said 
sentences to run concurrently. (R. 6). It 
has been held on numerous occasions that being 
an habitual criminal is not a substantive 
crime but a status. The language found at 
page 1000 of the Pacific Reporter in State v. 
Wood, 2 Ut2d 34, 268 P2d 998 is decisive: 
"This court has held that being 
an habitual criminal is a status, 
and to be ·charged with being an 
habitual criminal is not to be 
charged with a crime." (citations 
omitted) 
In the fairly recent case of Zeimer v. Turner, 
14 Ut2d 232, 381 P2d 721, 723, the court states 
the significance of being charged. as an habitual 
criminal by the following language: 
·"Being an habitual criminal is a 
status, and to be charged with 
being an habitual criminal is not 
to be charged with a crime. The 
habitual criminal statute will 
apply only upon a conviction of 
the criminal offense last charged. 
Its invocation does not inflict 
additional or further punishment 
for the prior convictions or 
impose a new punishment therefor. 
It only serves to make more severe 
the punishment for the last or· sub- · 
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sequent offense which might be 
imposed because of the previous 
convictions." 
Only one punishment or sentence can be 
imposed, if any. If this Court finds that 
the state carried its burden of proof in show-
ing the prior oonviction then a sentence for 
a term of not less than fifteen years is pro-
per. If the Trial Court erred in allowing 
into evidence Exhibits 1 and 2, then a term 
of not more than five years is correct. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant as a matter of law is entitled 
to have his Motion granted directing a verdict 
in his favor, or in the alternative, the Motion 
to Dismiss granted at the close of the State's 
case in chief. 
No evidence exists to corroborate the testi-
mony of the three accomplices. The statutory 
commandof Section 77-31-18 is clear and decisive 
of the motion. 
In the alternative, it is submitted that 
reversible error was committed by refusing to 
instruct the jury on the law regarding the 
testimony of accomplices. Further reversible 
error was committed by the Trial Court's refusal 
to instruct on a lesser offense and the 
admission of the immaterial, hearsay, but highly 
prejudicial evidence of the credit cards under 
the guise of impeachment. 
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In the alternative, it is submitted that 
the state failed to carry its burden of proof 
to establish the status of Appellant being an 
habitual criminal inasmuch as the Court erred 
in admitting into evidence Exhibits 1 and 2. 
Appellant can be sentenced to a term of no 
more than five years to be served at the Utah 
· State· Prison. · · · 
Respectfully submitted, 
NESLEN AND MOCK 
,, 
By~---------------------
J ame s R. Brown 
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